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According to classical legal positivism, the prerequisite to being selected as a judge on the
International Court of Justice is legal expertise and high moral character – the personality of
the judge is therefore merely the subject of idle curiosity. American Legal Realists understood
that one could not explain past decisions or predict future decisions merely by extrapolating
rules; account needed to be taken of history, culture, politics, economics, and the personality
of the judge. As a person, Judge Oda is famous for his self-control in personal comportment. As
a judge he is a study in independence, having produced an unmatched number of dissents and
separate opinions. His contribution to international lawwill continue to inﬂuence us.
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1. INTRODUCTION
National treasures areplaced reverently inmuseums, apracticewhichcelebrates the
objectofcreativity rather thanthecreatorandhis livinggenius. In1955,however, the
Japanese government, recognizing a need to commemorate the creator, designated
the artists Tomimoto Kenkichi, Ishiguro Munemaru, Hamada Shoji, and Arakawa
Toyozo as ‘Living National Treasures’. Were the international legal community to
follow suit, one of the ﬁrst to be so designated would be Judge Shigeru Oda. He is,
indeed, a living international treasure. As such, it is proper and entirely ﬁtting for
the Leiden Journal of International Law to take the occasion of his retirement from
the bench of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to reﬂect, not simply upon his
immense production as scholar – 18 books – and as a judge – a larger oeuvre than
anyonewhohas sat on the ICJ or its predecessor – but also upon theman – the living
treasure.
Theuniquedramaof eachofour lives is indispensable tounderstandingourselves
andwhatwedo.Nodramaisricherormore important thananyother,butsomeprove
more inﬂuential than others. This is especially so if, following a traumatic internal
struggle – one thinks of Leonardo, Luther, and Gandhi – we go on to discharge roles
that project and amplify our inner lives so that they embrace many others in our
community and, eventually, in other communities.
* Myres S. McDougal Professor of International Law, Yale Law School. This article was originally prepared for
delivery at the Program for Presentation to His Excellency Shigeru Oda, Judge at the International Court of
Justice, of the Festschrift in his Honor, 16 March 2002, at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public
Law and International Law, Heidelberg, Germany.
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The importance of the inner drama of each life is not limited to those who
serve as our spiritual or political leaders. We are all important, but our judges are
distinctive and special. For they are empowered to issue binding decisions that
conﬁrm, adapt, or rework the basic values of society, the values at stake in what
Karl Llewellyn called the great ‘trouble cases’ of each era. The artist may touch,
sometimes change those who choose to be his audience. The judge affects the
normative structure of theworld inwhichwe live, the structure uponwhichwe rely
andwithwhichwecontenddaily, the structure that shapesusandouractions. In this
sense,weallﬁndourselves ineluctablymembersof theaudience ineachgreat judge’s
theatre.
If personality is one factor accounting forwhat each of us does, the personality of
the judge inhis or her judicial rolemaybeof substantial and immediate importance.
Because of the way in which judges work, an inquiry into their personalities is, in
some ways, easier than a similar inquiry into those of other decision makers. Every
decisionmakerleavesmaterialthatcanbestudied,butjudges,particularlydissenting
or concurring judges, leave a distinctive record, a written corpus in which the
evidence of how he or she reacted to events and then rationalized and incorporated
those reactions can be examined in terms of the forces that worked on and in
their personalities. Studying that material can help the student better explain how
decisions are made, how law evolves and how andwhy the judge conceived of him-
or herself and the judicial function.
The conception of a living national treasure assumes that the real miracle is not
the object created, but the creator and his unique creative process. In a parallel
fashion, any inquiry into the personality of a judge presupposes certain important
jurisprudential assumptions. In classical positivism, law is a body of rules and
judges are technicians. Consistentwith this jurisprudential frame, the prerequisites
to being selected as a judge on the ICJ are, according to Article 2 of the Statute of
the ICJ, only legal expertise and high moral character. Lapses in moral character
may be investigated. Beyond that, the personality of the judge is no more than the
subject of idle curiosity. Since the judge is not considered central in shaping the law,
and information about the judge’s personality is not supposed to be useful for the
predictive or explanatory tasks of the practitioner or legal scholar, why study it?
American Legal Realists, effecting a paradigm shift in jurisprudence as radical as
Copernicus’s in astronomy,provideda readyanswer to this question.OliverWendell
HolmesspoketothepractisingNorthAmericanlawyerwhenhesaidthatthepractice
of law is nothing more pretentious than the prediction of what courts will, in fact,
do.TheLegalRealistsunderstood thatonecouldnot explainpastdecisionsorpredict
future decisionsmerely by extrapolating rules, nomatterhowrigorously logical one
tried to be. Explaining why past decisions had been made the way they were and
predictinghowfuturedecisionsmightbemaderequiredtheobserver,orpractitioner,
as the casemight be, to take account of history, culture, current politics, economics,
and, in particular, the personality of the judge. The judges of United States domestic
lawweremoved centre stage; the rulesweremoved to thewings and the ‘who’ of the
legal process alongwith its ‘what’ became a legitimate – and professionally useful –
focus of scholarship.
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In contrast to the situation in the United States where, from the earliest days
of the republic, judicial decision has been fundamental and central to the polit-
ical experience, judicial decision was long a marginal part of the international
political system. Thus, although serious and searching biographies have been writ-
ten of critical international political personalities, there has been, until Professor
McWhinney’s studies, no comparable biographical interest in the lives of interna-
tional judges. Prior to the formation of the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ), adjudications were carried out only by consent of the states concerned. The
issues submitted were carefully circumscribed, as were, often, the principles of law
to be applied. This left little room for judicial creativity, and creativity was hardly
invited. In addition, the persons selected to decide the issues operated ad hoc so
that, outside claims commissions, few international lawyers could expect to decide
more than one or two cases in their careers. The result was that, when it came
to individual judges, there was neither a jurisprudential ‘who’ nor a ‘what’ worth
studying.
While the formation of the PCIJ had created new possibilities for the ‘who’ and
‘what,’ another, more troubling, obstacle arose virtually contemporaneously with
the creation of the ICJ, keepingmany of its judges from leaving any kind of personal
stamp on the law. During the ColdWar, totalitarian dictatorships contributed a sig-
niﬁcant number of judges to the ICJ. Unpleasant as it may be to observe, there is no
reason to believe that the judges appointed to external arenas by those dictatorships
were allowed to be any more independent than those appointed to internal arenas.
Where judges, the myth of judicial independence notwithstanding, are subject to
concealed, but effective political control, their personalities are not critical to un-
derstanding how the power process operates.Who remembers the names of Stalin’s
judges, let alone produces Festschriften for them?
2. PERSONALITY
Judge Oda is a particularly attractive subject for inquiry, since hemaywell have had
the most dramatic inner life of any judge now on the Court, and his oeuvre is so
distinctivethatcertainquestionspracticallyshootoutof it.Ofcourseonewonders,as
one would in the case of any intriguing judge, about Oda’s parents, his class origins,
his childhood, his adolescence, his faith and religious struggles, his relations to
those closest to him in his family, and his culture. Happily, Professor McWhinney
has supplied us with much of this material in the ﬁrst of a series of biographies of
judges of the ICJ that he is editing. But there is another critical question particular
to Judge Oda’s life: how he dealt with the collective trauma that ripped apart Japan
during his formative years. For Judge Oda is a member of what the Japanese called
the ‘mid-war’ generation, thosewhowere shaped by the prewar political culture but
cameof age in the immediatepostwar,withvirtually all of their cultural preparation
shattered – indeed atomized – into irrelevance.
As JudgeOda hasmentioned to students he has addressed in theUnited States, he
was a university student during the war and had been trained as a kamikaze pilot,
the quintessential personal implementation of the war catechism, ‘To match our
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training against their numbers and our ﬂesh against their steel.’1 The young Oda
was destined to die in a suicide attack and would have – if atomic bombs had not
brought the war to an abrupt end.
One cannot help but wonder about the inner dynamics of a man whose life was
saved by the weapon that destroyed so many of his countrymen and the memory
of which continues to traumatize so many members of subsequent generations.
What were the implications for Judge Oda of almost immediately entering the law
faculty of a private university in the United States that was well-known for its
inﬂuential contacts with the United States government? Judge Oda was the ﬁrst
Japanese student to come to the Yale Law School after the war. What did it mean
to him to study there with Myres S. McDougal, a man who had held high posts in
that government during thewar, had supported the decision to drop the bombs, and,
indeed, had ledNorthAmerica’s international legal defense of postwar atmospheric
testing of atomic and hydrogen bombs in the Paciﬁc?
Kenzaburo Oe¨, the brilliant Japanese novelist who became an unofﬁcial
spokesman for the mid-war generation, relates a daily ritual that must have been a
profound formative experience:
throughout thewar, apart of eachday inevery Japanese schoolwasdevoted toa terrible
litany. The Ethics teacher would call the boys to the front of the class and demand of
themone by onewhat theywould do if the Emperor commanded them to die. Shaking
with fright, the child would answer: ‘I would die, Sir, I would rip open my belly and
die.’ Students passed the imperial portrait with their eyes to the ground, afraid their
eyeballs would explode if they looked His Imperial Majesty in the face.2
The empire collapsed. The emperor, a god-king and the linchpin of the world of the
Japanese of that period,was revealed as an ordinary, fallible humanbeing.Moreover,
in a Confucian society in which the authority of superiors was to be unquestioned,
the superiorswere exposed asnot simply fallible, but oftenwicked, sometimes crim-
inal, and, above all, unworthy of trust. John Nathan, translator of Oe¨’s remarkable
novel, A Personal Matter, writes of the continuing, perhaps lifelong, consequences
for a Japanese of that period of having been denied his ‘ethical inheritance’:
The values that regulated life in the world he knew as a child, however fatally, were
blown to smithereens at the end of the war. The crater that remained is a gaping crater
still, despite imported ﬁller like Democracy.
To be sure, in this century much of this sort of trauma is not a uniquely Japanese
phenomenon. It has recurred, mutatis mutandis, in other settings: for Germans in
their ongoing and courageousVergangenheitsbewaltigung, for those RomanCatholics
for whom God has died, for communists listening to Khrushchev’s exposure of
Stalin’s crimes and watching their empire crumble, and perhaps for Muslims who
must now confront the implications for their faith of al-Qaida’s fundamentalist
challenge. But in few places could it have been more individually wrenching than
1. R. Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (1946), 24.
2. J. Nathan, ‘Translator’s Note’, in K. Oe¨, A Personal Matter (1968), viii. For a moving depiction of a child’s life
at the time of Japan’s surrender, see K. Oe¨, ‘The Day the Emperor Spoke in a Human Voice’, New York Times,
7 May 1995, 103.
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in Japan, a fact that makes Japanese intellectuals of this period so fascinating, and
makes their literature, which has tried to describe and plumb the experience, such
haunting human documents of remarkable intensity and brilliance.
Judge Oda survived the experience and, ever since, he has presented a serene
persona to the world around him. One can only struggle to imagine the trauma he
may have suffered as he, with all the others in his generation, went through the
process of the disintegration and reconstruction of their inner world and the ways
inwhich that processmight relate to the remarkably consistent jurisprudence to be
found in the judicial oeuvre of Shigeru Oda.
Given his centrality in international decisionmaking, Judge Oda’s inner life will
remain a subject for further inquiry, but his qualities are so distinct that one can
easily sketch something of his personality merely by observing his behaviour and
by reading his judicial opinions.
As an individual, Judge Oda is famous for his extraordinary self-control in personal
comportment: who has ever seen him angry, indeed less than perfectly courteous
and digniﬁed? Yet Judge Oda is not aloof or compulsively private. He is open and
reﬂective.
As a judge he is a study in independence. His resolution is legendary. At the ICJ,
he has produced an unmatched number of dissents and separate opinions, some
differingonlyslightly fromthemajority. Innoneof themwashe joinedbyanother
member of the Court. Yet the dissents do not reveal a ‘wrecker’, a person who is
at all ‘anti-institutional’, as some dissents, unfortunately, sometimes do. Indeed,
in reading through the corpus of Judge Oda’s work, one is struck by the number
of cases, especially in the latter part of his career, in which Judge Oda expresses
serious doubts about the core issue of the majority conception of the law or the
facts as narrated in the opinion and yet supports the majority.
Judge Oda is also known for his distinctive ex cathedra style: the extraordinarily
detailed and systematic exposition of every step in the logical process, as if the
writer-craftsman were unwilling to allow himself to make a leap or to take
anything for granted. It is a demand for themost explicit rationality and an extra-
ordinary concern and respect for the political and legal commitments actually
made and discoverable. JudgeOda does not dig into texts and legislative histories.
He excavates them.
JudgeOda offers a disciplined and realistic vision of policy. JudgeOda’s positions, for
example, his commitment to equidistance in maritime boundary delimitation,
are neither impractical nor impracticable. Quite to the contrary – equidistance
may bemore practical than equitable principles!
Just as Judge Oda labours to ﬁnd the legal rule that correctly ﬁts each set of facts,
he also disciplines his opinions, writing no more than necessary to address the
problem at hand. He has written short opinions – one of his later concurrences is
only two sentences, and the longer opinions owe their length to the complexity
of the problem, which Judge Oda acknowledges and addresses explicitly. Future
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generations will argue over which of his opinions are more persuasive or even
correct, but all will agree that no opinion is wordy or windy.
Of Judge Oda’s remarkable intellectual independence and strength of will much
could be said, but one telling example, particularly close to my own experience,
will sufﬁce. Although Judge Oda studied with Myres McDougal for three years
and won his close and lifelong friendship, he was one of the few students who
largely resisted the inﬂuence ofMcDougal, who, asmany in this roomknow,was
amagnetic andoverpoweringpersonality. Instead,Oda selected and incorporated
only those concepts, techniques, and linguistic components from the master’s
opus that served his own purposes. His doctoral dissertation, ‘The Riches of the
Sea and International Law’, which conceives of the oceans in classic McDougal
fashion as a multi-purpose resource, proceeds in a manner that is distinctively
not McDougal. In a charming tribute to his teacher in a book he dedicated to
him in 1977, Judge Oda wrote that without Professor McDougal’s ‘kindness and
friendship over the past quarter of a century, I could not have carried out my
research in international law, although I have become somewhat heretical’. I
would not call it heretical and do not believe that Professor McDougal would
have. It shows the inﬂuence of New Haven, but it is different and distinctively
JudgeOda. Incidentally, I knowofnoother instance inwhichProfessorMcDougal
accepted a non-McDougal dissertation, yet took such pride in his student.
3. JURISPRUDENCE
Students of the judicial process appreciate that while all decision is concerned with
the future, much of judging turns on certain ‘givens’, inherited factors, such as past
agreements andpast decisions. Theories of interpretation are, in effect, philosophies
of how one relates to the ‘givens’ of the law and can provide an important insight
into the values andmethods of a judge. Judge Oda has a clear and distinctive theory
of judicial interpretation, compiled from what may be a unique set of inﬂuences.
His legal formation began at the ‘Japanese School of International Law’, and this
was later tested and transformed by his exposure to the policy sciences approach
at Yale. Themethod shaped by Professors Yokota and Taoka, powerful inﬂuences in
Japanese jurisprudence at the time the youngOdawas a student, emphasized, on the
one hand, a Kelsenian normativity and, on the other, the social function or role and
the political origin of particular rules. In contrast,MyresMcDougal’s theory focused
on the decision maker and his or her tasks, and sought to equip the decision maker
with a set of intellectual tools that would facilitate the performance of those tasks:
tools for scrutinizing the self, the ultimate instrument of perception and evaluation,
for organizing relevant data in the environment, for identifying and clarifying the
policies at stake and, ﬁnally, procedures for actuallymaking choices.With respect to
the speciﬁc task of interpretation,McDougal and his associates ransacked the social
science literature for methods for determining the genuine shared expectations of
the parties; methods for supplementing them when unanticipated contingencies
arose; andmethods for tempering and policing expectations that ran against critical
community policies.
JUDGE SHIGERU ODA: A TRIBUTE TO AN INTERNATIONAL TREASURE 63
JudgeOda appears tohavedrawn frombothof these sources. Buthehas fashioned
his owndistinct interpretivemethod,which hasmanifested itselfmost consistently
in his approach to the recurring problem of international jurisdiction. Judge Oda’s
decisions reﬂect his lifelong conviction that the ICJ must not legislate, and that his
leeway in decision making is conﬁned by certain limits inherent in the role of the
international judge. Some of Judge Oda’s colleagues on the Court and many com-
mentatorsdisagree. Indomesticcourts, andcertainly intheUnitedStates, contingent
lawmaking competences are accepted as legitimate, if not mandatory, functions of
the courts concerned; the quality of the work of the courts engaged in this function
is, in large part, judged by the quality of its legislative creativity. However, these var-
ious courts operate in domestic political contexts in which this contingent judicial
lawmaking is accepted. The ICJ, by contrast, requires an explicit authorization to
engage in decision ex aequo et bono. It seems clear that the Statute was not intended
to bestow a general power of equitable decision.
Sir Robert Jennings has said:
Ad hoc tribunals can settle particular disputes; but the function of the established
‘principal judicial organ of the United Nations’ must include not only the settlement
of disputes but also the scientiﬁc development of general international law. . . there is
therefore nothing strange in the ICJ fulﬁlling a similar function for the international
community.
But, with respect, the Court seems particularly ill structured for a progressive devel-
opment role. Lawmaking isnot aphilosophical or scientiﬁcexercise. It is quintessen-
tially political, requiring knowledge of the diverse interests and the intensity of
demand of the political actors engaged, and then skill in trading support and form-
ing coalitions. The Court cannot do this, and even trying would compromise its
judicial character. As for the International Law Commission, which has an explicit
‘progressive development’ competence, it can engage in this only ad referendum,
with the ultimate decision in the hands of theGeneral Assembly or an international
diplomatic conference, both explicitly political institutions. Could a court – indeed,
any court – render judgments ad referendum? I do not address the moral issue of
purporting to make law for communities that have not authorized or agreed to it,
which is the moral basis of the demand of national communities for sovereignty.
Judge Oda’s jurisprudence reﬂects a nuanced appreciation of the very special
position of the international adjudicator. The conception of the proper judicial role
that emerges from the corpus of Judge Oda’s decisions is neither general ‘progres-
sive development’ nor the caricature of blind application of ‘rules’, legislation, or
agreements. It is, rather, a conception of a judicial role, restricted like any other,with
limitations that are accepted andhonoured by the role player.Within this role, rules
are properly seen as communications carrying relevant and authoritative policy
information that must be shaped in the idiosyncratic texture of each controversy,
to provide a decision that best approximates the minimum order and larger policy
objectives of the community. Make no mistake: this is no easy task. The constant
possibility of inﬁltration, whether in factual characterization or legal speciﬁcation,
of personal preferences and prejudices, some operating at levels of consciousness
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so deep that the judge may be unaware of them, greatly complicate the judge’s
job. Hence Socrates’ injunction, ‘know thyself’, is as fundamental and constant a
requirement for the judge as it is for the philosopher. One thinks, in this regard, of
JudgeOda’s reﬂection onhimself, one of the very few in his entire corpus ofwork, in
Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France). He voted with the Court to dismiss the request
to reopen the case but added,
as the Member of the Court from the only country which has suffered the devastating
effects of nuclear weapons, I feel bound to express my personal hope that no further
tests of any kind of nuclear weapons will be carried out under any circumstances.
To be sure, the judicial function involves ‘supplementing and policing’ the appli-
cation of inherited law,3 which becomes particularly urgent in periods of rapid
transition. This is not judicial activism, but an appropriate discharge of the judicial
function. It is quite distinct from an active lawmaking role that deems itself entitled
to ignore expressions of authoritative policy and assumea competence to determine
itself, case by case and ‘progressively’, what the law should be. That is a conception
which Judge Oda has steadfastly resisted.
While several of themajority’s initiatives havewon praise in some quarters, they
have, intheviewofothers, ledtheCourt intounsuccessful initiatives ininternational
constitutive change. For a period of time, the Court seemed to be elaborating a
theory of jurisdiction no longer based on consent. Judge Oda steadfastly resisted
this initiative and the Court has essentially returned to his view. The majority’s
initiatives have also led to theCourt’s assumption, especially in the area ofmaritime
boundary delimitation, that it is entitled to change the law on a case-by-case basis.
Here again, Judge Oda’s work ismarked by a consistent and detailed examination of
existing prescriptions, on the basis ofwhich he tries to fashion the appropriate legal
response. Indeed, inmany cases in which the ICJ arguably had a substantive impact
on international law, Judge Oda has raised a voice of reservation and opposition.
Inmyview,JudgeOdaisright. If theCourtreachesfor jurisdictionincasesinwhich
there is no consent or tries to engage in legislative exercises without authorization,
it puts itself in an awkward position, for a far-reaching judicial lawmaking role
requires subterfuge. Article 38 of the Statute is clear, so the Court cannot say:
Formula A is the law, but we are now putting on our judicial–legislative hats and are
going to decide on the basis of formula B, in the exercise of our competence to engage
in discretionary ‘progressive development’.
In the pretense that formula B is the law, the Court will have to engage in legal
legerdemain that will confuse the community as to themethods by which law is to
be inferred, will undermine conﬁdence in legal expectations, and will undermine
the conﬁdence of others in itself. All of thiswill have proliferating consequences for
the international legal system. Beyond the erosion of stability of expectation, these
lawmaking initiatives often have high institutional costs. States are not obliged to
turn to the Court for the resolution of their disputes. When they do, their legal
3. M. S. McDougal et al., The Interpretation of International Agreements andWorld Public Order (1994).
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advisers have presumably studied the relevant parts of international law and enter
the Court with some conﬁdence that it will be applied. To have the Court ad hoc
‘progressively develop’ new norms with retroactive effect will hardly encourage
responsible legal advisers to refer cases to the Court.
4. INFLUENCE
Judge Oda’s personal judicial oeuvre is the largest in the history of the PCIJ and the
ICJ. It is theoretically consistent andprovides apicturewindowonthe jurisprudence
and intellectual modus operandi of its creator. But it is comprised of dissents and
of separate opinions that sometimes read like dissents. It has often been a minor-
ity view. The judges who have the most manifest inﬂuence on any court will be
those who write the majority opinion (which of course appears anonymously in
the ICJ’s practice) or those who, in cameral deliberations, had the greatest inﬂuence
on shaping the judgment. The author of the separate opinion, whether concurring
or dissenting, in effect acknowledges that the position he or she espoused was not
accepted by the majority. But do not minimize the contribution of the dissent-
ing opinion. Justice Brennan of the United States Supreme Court said that ‘The
dissent . . . safeguards the integrity of the judicial decision-making process by keep-
ing the majority accountable for the rationale and consequences of its decision.’
Justice Frankfurter said that ‘Dissent is essential to an effective judiciary in a demo-
cratic society.’ Charles Evans Hughes, who sat on the PCIJ until he was recalled to
become Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, said famously that ‘A
dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the
intelligence of a future day.’
5. LEGACY
I have said enough to show why Judge Oda is an international ‘living treasure’ and
why he himself and his contribution to international law through his scholarship
and his service as a judge will continue, like great art, to be studied and to inﬂu-
ence us. It is scholarship, but more than scholarship. It is, ultimately, his steadfast
custodianship of what he called in his Declaration in Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Yugoslavia) ‘the legal conscience’.
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